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CO_E_FAILEDTOGETTOKENINFO
COM could not read required access-token information
CO_E_FAILEDTOGETTOKENINFO is HRESULT 2147549478 (0x80010126) from winerror.h. AllStat describes it as “Unable to obtain user info from an access token.” In the COM IAccessControl, DCOM client identity, trustee translation, token inspection, security descriptor, ACL, or serialization workflow, the code identifies a specific failure boundary and should not be replaced by a generic COM exception.
Handling this result correctly requires the code-specific postcondition, not merely the fact that FAILED(hr) is true.
Where it is encountered
- IAccessControl initialization, access checks, owner/trustee processing, and serialized ACL persistence. Record the interface, method, component version, thread, apartment, process, and correlation ID.
- Server-side DCOM impersonation, client blanket inspection, token and SID lookup.
- Security descriptor construction, DACL canonicalization, file-backed policy storage, or legacy NetAccess migration.
The immediate focus for it is token inspection for user SID, groups, privileges, type, statistics, or impersonation level after a token handle was obtained. Keep it attached to that operation; the same numeric severity outside the owning API does not supply enough context.
Decisive interpretation boundary
Before choosing recovery, verify that the information class, buffer sizing sequence, token access mask, and token lifetime are correct. That boundary prevents it from being misclassified as corruption, network failure, or a reason for an unsafe automatic retry.
Also confirm that all observed objects, tokens, buffers, proxies, metadata files, or ACLs belong to the current operation generation and were not retained from an earlier attempt.
Correct handling and recovery
Use the two-call buffer-size pattern, request <code>TOKEN_QUERY</code>, and keep the token valid until extraction completes. Reject incomplete identity data.
An unchanged retry loop for it can duplicate effects, deepen reentrancy, or hide an invalid lifetime transition.
Lifetime, retry, and cleanup rules
After it, determine whether the current object, interface pointer, call context, token, stream, metadata reader, asynchronous operation, or access-control instance remains valid. Release only resources owned by the failing attempt, cancel callbacks through their documented mechanism, and avoid double close, double commit, repeated activation, or replay of a non-idempotent remote method.
The retry policy for it should state the trigger, maximum attempts, cancellation owner, and reconciliation step for effects that may have completed elsewhere.
Difference from nearby HRESULTs
It occurs after token acquisition; open-token HRESULTs identify failure to obtain the handle itself.
Tests for it should force both results and verify that object lifetime, output use, and user messaging differ.
Practical scenario
An access-control component allocates a fixed buffer for <code>TokenGroups</code>. It switches to the required-size pattern and validates every returned SID.
A regression test should reproduce it, assert the raw HRESULT and all relevant outputs, then correct only the decisive condition and verify the intended success or neighboring failure result.
References
- Microsoft: IAccessControl
- Microsoft: IAccessControl::IsAccessAllowed
- Microsoft: AccessCheck
- Microsoft: LookupAccountSidW
- Microsoft: LookupAccountNameW
- Microsoft: access control lists
- Microsoft: canonical ACE order
- Microsoft: HRESULT values
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