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CO_E_INVALIDSID
A supplied security identifier is invalid
CO_E_INVALIDSID is HRESULT 2147549485 (0x8001012D) from winerror.h. AllStat describes it as “One of the security identifiers provided by the user was invalid.” In the COM IAccessControl, DCOM client identity, trustee translation, token inspection, security descriptor, ACL, or serialization workflow, the code identifies a specific failure boundary and should not be replaced by a generic COM exception.
The caller should keep this result intact through logging, exception translation, and RPC or language projection boundaries.
Where it is encountered
- IAccessControl initialization, access checks, owner/trustee processing, and serialized ACL persistence. Record the interface, method, component version, thread, apartment, process, and correlation ID.
- Server-side DCOM impersonation, client blanket inspection, token and SID lookup.
- Security descriptor construction, DACL canonicalization, file-backed policy storage, or legacy NetAccess migration.
The immediate focus for it is an ACL, trustee, token, or serialized access-control structure containing a SID that fails structural validation. Keep it attached to that operation; the same numeric severity outside the owning API does not supply enough context.
Decisive interpretation boundary
Before choosing recovery, verify that SID length, revision, subauthority count, memory extent, and provenance are known before dereferencing or copying it. The decisive boundary for it determines whether the same object can continue, a new object is required, or policy must change.
Also confirm that all observed objects, tokens, buffers, proxies, metadata files, or ACLs belong to the current operation generation and were not retained from an earlier attempt.
Correct handling and recovery
Reject the SID, regenerate it from a trusted account lookup or token, and validate serialized lengths at every boundary.
Reconcile partial output and server-side effects before attempting the operation again.
Lifetime, retry, and cleanup rules
After it, determine whether the current object, interface pointer, call context, token, stream, metadata reader, asynchronous operation, or access-control instance remains valid. Release only resources owned by the failing attempt, cancel callbacks through their documented mechanism, and avoid double close, double commit, repeated activation, or replay of a non-idempotent remote method.
The retry policy for it should state the trigger, maximum attempts, cancellation owner, and reconciliation step for effects that may have completed elsewhere.
Practical scenario
A custom policy file truncates the final subauthority of a SID. Import validation rejects the entry and obtains a fresh SID from the account name.
A regression test should reproduce it, assert the raw HRESULT and all relevant outputs, then correct only the decisive condition and verify the intended success or neighboring failure result.
Difference from nearby HRESULTs
It is structural invalidity; CO_E_NOMATCHINGNAMEFOUND can involve a structurally valid SID with no resolvable account name.
Tests for it should force both results and verify that object lifetime, output use, and user messaging differ.
References
- Microsoft: IAccessControl
- Microsoft: IAccessControl::IsAccessAllowed
- Microsoft: AccessCheck
- Microsoft: LookupAccountSidW
- Microsoft: LookupAccountNameW
- Microsoft: access control lists
- Microsoft: canonical ACE order
- Microsoft: HRESULT values
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