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SEC_E_DELEGATION_POLICY
SEC_E_DELEGATION_POLICY concerns client credential-delegation policy. The authentication exchange may be otherwise valid, but client policy refuses to send reusable credentials to the requested target.
Read the failure at the correct layer
Credential delegation is a policy decision made after identifying the target and authentication method in a client credential-delegation policy investigation. Capture the transport scheme, target name, server-authentication result, selected package, and applicable CredSSP policy entries. A valid user password does not override a rule that forbids sending reusable credentials.
Build an incident record
- 1. Target name and transport scheme as evaluated by the client
Determine whether the application is using CredSSP and which target SPN was evaluated. - 2. Selected authentication package and whether server identity was verified
Inspect Allow Fresh Credentials and related delegation policy lists, including exact SPN patterns. - 3. Effective credential-delegation policy and matching target pattern
Verify whether a safer Kerberos constrained-delegation design can replace full credential delegation.
For client credential-delegation policy, these observations are deliberately nonsecret: identifiers, lengths, provider names, policy selections, and state transitions usually support comparison without recording private keys, passwords, PINs, or plaintext.
Preserve the evidence chain
- Package and target name, requested and returned context attributes, and each SSPI return in order.
- Relevant Group Policy result, SPN or UPN resolution, contacted DC/KDC, and ticket or certificate identities.
- One permitted control target and one deliberately rejected target evaluated with the same client build in a client credential-delegation policy investigation.
Use two comparison axes
Compare the failing target with a deliberately permitted test target under the same policy, then compare Kerberos or certificate-authenticated identity with an NTLM-only path. Do not modify several Group Policy rules at once.
| Test | Interpretation |
|---|---|
| Same input, known-good path | For client credential-delegation policy, success moves attention toward the selected provider, policy, device, context, or transaction state. |
| Known-good input, failing path | For client credential-delegation policy, failure suggests that the environment or selected object is independently unable to perform the operation. |
| Original path after one isolated change | For client credential-delegation policy, this comparison demonstrates whether the proposed correction addresses the original condition. |
Do not collapse it into a neighboring code
This code is policy enforcement, not proof that the password or certificate is invalid. Adding a broad wildcard to make delegation succeed can expose credentials to unintended servers. Use the narrowest target rule and prove the server identity path first in a client credential-delegation policy investigation.
For client credential-delegation policy, also retain the original numeric value; neighboring constants can encode materially different remediation paths even when an application presents all of them as an authentication, certificate, or security failure.
Verification after the change
The client should delegate only to the intended authenticated target and continue to reject an unlisted or insufficiently authenticated control target.
Technical references
These sources define the HRESULT and the relevant client credential-delegation policy interface, protocol, or data format.
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