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DIGSIG_E_CRYPTO
DIGSIG_E_CRYPTO should be read at the cryptographic stage of digital signing boundary. The signature workflow reached a cryptographic primitive or private-key operation that failed without a more specific public digital-signature code. For cryptographic stage of digital signing, the useful diagnostic question is which concrete object and operation caused Windows to select this exact HRESULT—not whether a key, certificate, account, file, or device merely “works.”
Locate the first failing boundary
ASN.1 construction has progressed far enough to reach a cryptographic primitive or private-key operation. Capture the exact digest and signature algorithms, key provider and key identity, padding parameters, hash bytes, and the nested provider error.
Useful observations, not generic logs
| Record | Why it matters for this code |
|---|---|
| digest algorithm, signature algorithm, parameters, and data hash | Locates the failure in representation, object placement, or cryptographic execution. |
| private-key provider, key identifier, usage policy, and accessibility under the caller | Keeps ASN.1 syntax separate from certificate-chain policy. |
| the lower-level NTE or provider status returned by the sign or verify primitive | Produces a minimal signed-data case that another implementation can inspect. |
Code-specific checks:
- Record provider, key identifier, digest algorithm, signature algorithm, padding, and data hash.
- Test private-key access and signing with a minimal known message.
- Inspect the nested NTE or provider-specific failure before changing certificate-chain settings.
Correlate the failure with state changes
Record the transition from application objects to ASN.1 bytes and then to cryptographic execution., the first failing stage determines whether to inspect field placement, encoder input, decoder bytes, algorithm parameters, or private-key access. A final “signature invalid” message cannot recover that boundary after intermediate statuses are discarded in a cryptographic stage of digital signing investigation.
- In the path, minimal object model and encoded bytes with the first optional field that changes the result.
- Digest and signature algorithms, key provider, and lower-level provider status where applicable.
- Independent ASN.1 and signature observations using the exact original bytes.
Reproduction without destructive cleanup
In the path, sign a fixed small message with the same key and algorithm, then verify it independently. Separately run the production data hash through a known-good key where policy permits in a cryptographic stage of digital signing investigation. The controls distinguish key execution from data preparation.
| Test | Interpretation |
|---|---|
| Same input, known-good path | For cryptographic stage of digital signing, success moves attention toward the selected provider, policy, device, context, or transaction state. |
| Known-good input, failing path | For cryptographic stage of digital signing, failure suggests that the environment or selected object is independently unable to perform the operation. |
| Original path after one isolated change | For cryptographic stage of digital signing, this comparison demonstrates whether the proposed correction addresses the original condition. |
How this differs from similar failures
This code points to key/algorithm execution, whereas DIGSIG_E_ENCODE and DIGSIG_E_DECODE point to ASN.1 representation. Changing certificate-chain settings cannot repair a provider that cannot access the private key or perform the requested signature primitive.
For cryptographic stage of digital signing, keep representation, cryptographic execution, and trust evaluation separate. In this path, a byte sequence can decode correctly and still fail signature policy, while no chain repair can make malformed ASN.1 decode.
Regression check
The intended key must produce or verify the correct signature for the production algorithm, and the resulting signed object must still pass ASN.1 and trust processing. Keep a regression case that uses nonsecret identifiers and expected outcomes, including one negative control that must continue to fail.
Technical references
These sources define the HRESULT and the relevant cryptographic stage of digital signing interface, protocol, or data format.
- Microsoft Open Specifications: HRESULT values.
- ITU-T X.690: BER, CER and DER.
- RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax.
- Microsoft: Wintrust API.
Looking for a different code? Search another status or error code.