What does HRESULT 0x80280803 (TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING) mean?

 
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TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING

Technical interpretation

TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING (0x80280803) belongs to Windows command mediation around the TPM. The base What Is page already shows the short Windows message; the additional diagnostic value is that this result marks the TPM anti-hammering or dictionary-attack defense timer is active, so protected authorization attempts are being rejected.

The first producer to identify for TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING is TBS command blocking, virtual-handle translation, retry or anti-hammering logic. For TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING, windows TBS schedules and mediates commands from multiple clients. For TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING, it can block commands, translate virtual handles, request retry, and preserve anti-hammering policy before or after the raw device command path.

Inputs and state to capture

Preserve these TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING items before changing anything:

  • TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING and 0x80280803, the exact returning method or command, and the first nested status.
  • failed authorization count, lockout timing if available, affected entity, command and auth session, system time behavior, and prior failed attempts.
  • The TPM generation, manufacturer/firmware revision, Windows build, caller identity and TBS/provider state for TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING.
  • The complete opaque TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING request artifacts, redacting authorization secrets but not rewriting structure boundaries.

Validate without broad changes

Run this focused check: stop attempts and observe recovery after the policy-defined interval rather than testing more passwords. Do not combine the TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING test with firmware updates, TPM clearing, account changes, key recreation and policy edits in the same trial; such a result cannot isolate this boundary.

CheckpointPass condition
the TPM anti-hammering or dictionary-attack defense timer is active, so protected authorization attempts are being rejectedThe original TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING command reaches the next defined state without returning this result.
Security behaviorThe TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING verification still uses the intended TPM, authorization, locality and policy.
Output integrityThe object, digest, event log or state transition produced after TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING validates independently.

Neighboring response codes

Related resultSeparate meaning
TPM_E_RETRYThe TPM is too busy to respond to the command immediately, but the command could be resubmitted at a later time — a separate checkpoint when compared with TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING.
TPM_E_EMBEDDED_COMMAND_UNSUPPORTEDThe command within the transport is not supported — a separate checkpoint when compared with TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING.
TPM_E_EMBEDDED_COMMAND_BLOCKEDThe command within the transport was blocked — a separate checkpoint when compared with TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING.

The practical distinction is that TPM_E_RETRY reports temporary command load; this code is a security lockout caused by authorization failures.

Fix and verify

The supported direction is to correct the authorization source, respect lockout policy, and use supported recovery or administrative mechanisms. For TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING, do not disable command policy globally to make one test pass. For TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING, first establish the caller, command code and supported higher-level alternative, because command blocking is a security boundary.

If the same bytes still return TPM_E_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING after the documented preconditions are satisfied, retain this code-specific trace for the platform vendor or Windows component owner rather than erasing state.

Technical references


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