HRESULT 0x80310098 (FVE_E_FIPS_HASH_KDF_NOT

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Description:

The default BitLocker Key Derivation Function SP800-56A for ECC smart cards is not supported by your smart card. The Group Policy setting requiring FIPS-compliance prevents BitLocker from using any other key derivation function for encryption. You have to use a FIPS compliant smart card in FIPS restricted environments.

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FVE_E_CANT_LOCK_AUTOUNLOCK_ENABLED_VOLUME	FVE_E_ENH_PIN_INVALID

FVE_E_FIPS_HASH_KDF_NOT_ALLOWED

The failed prerequisite

FVE_E_FIPS_HASH_KDF_NOT_ALLOWED / 0x80310098 marks a rejected BitLocker transition: the smart-card public-key protector requires a key-derivation function that the card cannot perform under active FIPS restrictions.

Note: The same volume can remain strongly encrypted while a recovery-password, passphrase or export operation is rejected. When diagnosing this result, remember: Report the protector operation, not simply “BitLocker failed.”

Diagnostic map

Layer	FIPS-restricted key management
Proof to collect	smart-card model and middleware, certificate key type, advertised KDF support, FIPS policy and the exact protector operation
Different condition	a certificate trust or private-key access error; the certificate may be valid while the KDF capability is incompatible
First safe change	use a FIPS-compatible smart card/provider or an approved alternative protector rather than falling back silently to a disallowed KDF

Note: FIPS-restricted operation changes which protector, export and key-derivation paths BitLocker may use. When diagnosing this result, remember: The volume encryption algorithm and the protector workflow are separate layers, so a FIPS-related HRESULT should be traced to the exact protector or key-management call.

A focused verification sequence

record smart-card model and middleware, certificate key type, advertised KDF support, FIPS policy and the exact protector operation. Keep the full HRESULT and the first method that returned it because later cleanup calls can report a different state.
capture manage-bde -status and the protector inventory for the exact volume GUID, not only the drive letter, because letters can change in WinRE, clusters and deployment environments.
Export BitLocker operational events for the result failure and note the boot session, caller identity and management source; that evidence separates this BitLocker condition from a generic access or storage error.

Recommended operational response

use a FIPS-compatible smart card/provider or an approved alternative protector rather than falling back silently to a disallowed KDF.
After correcting the result prerequisite, refresh protection, conversion and lock state before one controlled retry; a cached UI message is not proof that the condition is still active.
Before a this result remediation deletes protectors, changes firmware mode, resizes partitions or decrypts a production drive, verify that an independent recovery method is available and escrowed in the intended directory or account.

manage-bde -protectors -get C:\ngpresult /h bitlocker-policy.html

Interpretation checkpoint

This result identifies a condition but not every owner of the surrounding state. Preserve the original caller, volume GUID and event sequence so the correction is applied at the right layer.

State checks specific to it

Checkpoint	How to interpret it for it
Before the call	Record the target identity and the pre-call FIPS-restricted key management state. The decisive boundary is that the smart-card public-key protector requires a key-derivation function that the card cannot perform under active FIPS restrictions.
At failure	Preserve smart-card model and middleware, certificate key type, advertised KDF support, FIPS policy and the exact protector operation. This proves whether it came from BitLocker itself or from a wrapper translating another result.
After correction	Use a FIPS-compatible smart card/provider or an approved alternative protector rather than falling back silently to a disallowed KDF. The request should then advance without removing an unrelated recovery route.
After reboot or remount	Recheck protection, conversion and lock state for it; a successful management call is incomplete if the next boot cannot unlock the volume.

Verification after the change

Success means more than the absence of a dialog. Confirm that the condition represented by it now matches the intended design, that the protector inventory has not lost an independent recovery route, and that the next reboot or remount can unlock the volume. If the request advances to another HRESULT, record both values in order because that transition reveals the next unmet prerequisite.

Official references

Reference set for it:

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