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RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_TIME_SKEW
Protocol boundary: RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_TIME_SKEW
The operational meaning of this result is tied to selecting an allowed authentication method, validating the challenge realm, and establishing a protected SIP transport: SIP authentication validation failed because client and server time differ beyond the accepted window.
Log this result as 0x80EE006C in the RTC interface facility 0xEE, not only as a signed decimal; the facility distinguishes local RTC validation from a response status mapped by the stack.
The first useful check is to record UTC clocks, time source/synchronization state, challenge timestamp data, and timezone-independent values. The result must be separated from nearby conditions because time skew is not corrected by changing a password or repeating the same challenge.
Minimum incident record
The earliest callback or return site is the most valuable; later cleanup can replace the original state, so correlate the code with the object generation that produced it.
- Code-specific proof: record UTC clocks, time source/synchronization state, challenge timestamp data, and timezone-independent values.
- Owning object: client/server UTC time and
TLSphase. - Wire evidence: 401 or 407 challenge source.
- Lifecycle generation: authentication scheme and realm.
When recording this result, redact credentials, full telephone numbers, private contact lists, and message bodies; retain permitted URI domains, header names, byte counts, hashes, transaction identifiers, timestamps, and state transitions.
Protocol and object boundary
| RTC area | SIP authentication and TLS identity boundary |
|---|---|
| Objects to correlate | profile authentication method, challenge headers, realm, credential source, TLS certificate and tunnel |
| Condition to prove | SIP authentication validation failed because client and server time differ beyond the accepted window |
| Safe corrective direction | restore trustworthy time synchronization and obtain a fresh challenge |
RTC profile rules tie some authentication methods to TCP or TLS; Basic authentication requires TLS in the legacy API contract; the second rule relevant to it is that A certificate failure, a challenge mismatch, and invalid credentials occur at different layers and need different remediation.
Correct application response
Recovery from it should be narrow: restore trustworthy time synchronization and obtain a fresh challenge; while handling it, do not let a higher layer simultaneously recreate the same session, registration, listener, or profile.
Before retrying it, classify the previous operation as definitely failed, definitely completed, or remotely uncertain; that distinction prevents duplicate dialogs, bindings, transfers, or roaming mutations.
Example: A resumed laptop has a stale clock and cannot authenticate to the registrar.
How to prove the condition
- Start from
0x80EE006Cand it, then find the method/event pair that first exposed it. - the proof step is to record UTC clocks, time source/synchronization state, challenge timestamp data, and timezone-independent values.
- Check whether the failure was local before transmission, produced during RTC state validation, or mapped from a remote response.
- Keep the analysis at the right boundary: time skew is not corrected by changing a password or repeating the same challenge.
- After you restore trustworthy time synchronization and obtain a fresh challenge, repeat the smallest reproducer rather than restarting the entire application environment.
Use RTC event state to interpret the protocol trace, and use the trace to verify what left or reached the host; this two-sided correlation identifies the producing layer.
Nearby failure modes
The practical separator is this: it is tied to the condition “SIP authentication validation failed because client and server time differ beyond the accepted window”; preserve that producing boundary before choosing recovery; for this HRESULT, compare that boundary with these related RTC values.
RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_FAILED | the selected SIP authentication attempt was rejected or could not validate for the challenge |
|---|---|
RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED | the challenge requests an authentication scheme the RTC profile or stack cannot use |
RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_HEADER_SENT | the RTC authentication state already sent authorization for this challenge path and will not repeat it blindly |
Facility equality is not semantic equality; route each contrasted value through its own recovery branch.
Actions that do not address this condition
- With it, do not disable certificate checking or lower transport security to make authentication appear successful.
- Do not record Authorization header contents or plaintext passwords.
- A wrapper handling it should retain the original HRESULT instead of replacing it with an undifferentiated call failure.
Verification after a fix
A regression test should reproduce “SIP authentication validation failed because client and server time differ beyond the accepted window” with the smallest profile, message, session, presence, media, or PINT fixture; assert 0x80EE006C, the responsible method/event, and the object state after the result; then change only the decisive precondition and verify that the corrected run leaves no stale transaction or RTC object.
Technical references
- Microsoft profile creation rules — API or protocol rules used to interpret it.
- Microsoft RTC return constants — authoritative context for the boundary.
- SIP authentication and TLS — definitions relevant when reproducing it.
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