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SL_REMAPPING_SP_PUB_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN_HASHID
What the security processor has established
SL_REMAPPING_SP_PUB_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN_HASHID (0xC004D207) is emitted by cryptographic processing inside the security processor. It marks a specific point inside the provider, algorithm, key, hash, signature and block-processing stage used to authenticate protected licensing data: the requested hash algorithm identifier is not recognized by the selected provider.
This distinction matters because hash lookup fails before a digest can be calculated or compared. A later “not licensed” state should not replace the first exact HRESULT in logs.
State to compare on both sides of the failure
- provider and algorithm identifiers
- key type and key-material length
- cipher mode, block size and padding mode
- hash state and digest length
- signature format, length and verification key
Where it sits in the licensing pipeline
Algorithm selection, key lookup, block formatting and signature verification are independent boundaries; a failure in one does not prove corruption at the others. To verify this, record hash ID, provider ID, expected digest length and policy source.
A reproducible troubleshooting path
- Use read-only inspection first: record hash ID, provider ID, expected digest length and policy source.
Safe recovery direction
Use a supported hash identifier consistent with the signed object and platform policy.
Representative case: A migrated policy contains a hash ID unsupported by the current security processor.
Do not confuse it with these nearby results
| Result | Different condition |
|---|---|
SL_REMAPPING_SP_PUB_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN_ATTRIBUTEID | Compared with this result, a cryptographic object references an attribute identifier not defined by the provider contract. |
SL_REMAPPING_SP_PUB_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN_KEYID | Compared with this result, the requested cryptographic key type or key identifier is unknown to the selected provider. |
SL_REMAPPING_SP_PUB_CRYPTO_HASH_FINALIZED | Compared with it, additional data was supplied after the hash object had already been finalized. |
Actions that usually destroy useful evidence
- Do not publish keys, decrypted license blobs or complete protected payloads in a support ticket.
- Do not disable signature or padding validation to make the operation continue.
Technical references
- CNG cryptographic primitive functions — supported state, API or recovery information relevant to this HRESULT.
- BCryptHashData — reference for evidence collection and post-repair verification.
- BCryptVerifySignature — technical contract for the subsystem producing it.
- Signing data with CNG — official platform context used to interpret it.
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