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NS_E_DRM_DRMV2CLT_REVOKED
The first reliable fact
The condition encoded by 0xC00D28B6 is not generic playback failure; it is that a legacy DRM v2 client component required by the operation is revoked. For NS_E_DRM_DRMV2CLT_REVOKED, the owner is WMDRM for Network Devices; its working contract covers the transmitter/receiver protocol that registers a network playback device, approves it, validates proximity, opens a protected session and transcrypts licensed content for that receiver.
The shortest path to a defensible diagnosis is to record component identity/version and revocation-list entry.
Incident data
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Owner | operation, API/callback, object or session identifier, and component/device version associated with this result |
| Direct check | record component identity/version and revocation-list entry |
| Policy input | requested action plus the exact license, certificate, profile, output or registration property evaluated by this result |
| Temporal state | trusted/system time, validity interval, request sequence and retry number when they influence this result |
| Lower result | the earliest store, network, cryptographic, driver or provider status preceding the final it wrapper |
The transaction to reconstruct
The security decision represented by it depends on device certificate and serial number, registration-database entry, approval flag, validation timestamp, network session, protocol message and transcrypt policy. Record the exact WMDRM-ND message type, device identifier, certificate chain, registration state, round-trip timing and the first protocol HRESULT from the same it attempt.
This evidence matters because the rejected condition is specifically that a legacy DRM v2 client component required by the operation is revoked.
A controlled before/after test
A useful failure model for it links cause and recovery: a legacy DRM v2 client component required by the operation is revoked. Verify that model when you record component identity/version and revocation-list entry, then make the smallest change needed to update to a non-revoked supported DRM client component. Keeping the result transition intact also shows whether a retry reused stale state or actually reevaluated the corrected input.
What the result does not prove
The established fact is that a legacy DRM v2 client component required by the operation is revoked. That fact does not independently establish damaged media bytes, a missing decoder, a generally broken network, or invalid rights for every other action.
If the Player, encoder, setup program or device layer later emits a broader error, retain it as the first specific result. The object and operation attached to it are usually more diagnostic than a later cleanup or user-interface summary.
Reproduce at the owning layer
- Preserve it and
0xC00D28B6before cleanup, fallback or another media item changes the context. - Compare the failure with a known-good case that changes only the property named by this condition: a legacy DRM v2 client component required by the operation is revoked.
- Apply the narrow correction for it: update to a non-revoked supported DRM client component.
- Associate it with its current WMDRM for Network Devices object and the requested action.
- Run the direct check for it: record component identity/version and revocation-list entry.
- Repeat the same action with the same content/device identity and verify that it is not replaced by another policy or trust failure.
Do not merge these failures
| Result | Why it points elsewhere |
|---|---|
NS_E_DRM_INVALID_LICENSEBLOB | the Cardea request contains a license blob that fails format, integrity or binding checks |
NS_E_DRM_INCLUSION_LIST_REQUIRED | the requested operation requires an inclusion list that the license does not contain |
NS_E_DRM_RIV_TOO_SMALL | the revocation-information version available to the client is below the minimum required by policy |
Restore the required state
A matching correction is to update to a non-revoked supported DRM client component. Success means that the same requested action is accepted after that precise state change, not merely that another file or device happens to work.
- Evidence for it is easy to destroy; Do not delete the complete device-registration database before preserving the failing device record and certificate chain; that removes the distinction between registration, approval, validation and session failures.
- Do not alter trusted time, revocation enforcement, certificate validation or output policy merely to suppress it; that bypasses the decision instead of correcting its input.
- Retain one failing artifact and one corrected artifact so the resolution of it can be regression-tested.
Keep a diagnostic fixture
For the final it test, keep the content KID or file hash, requested action, user/account, device identity and output route unchanged wherever they apply.
Technical references
- Windows Media DRM 10 for Network Devices — lists the security and state transitions used to interpret it.
- Device registration — defines the platform objects used when diagnosing it.
- Using the WMDRM-ND protocol — documents the protocol or API boundary behind it.
- MS-DRMND protocol specification — provides the normative workflow relevant to it.
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