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RPC_E_NO_GOOD_SECURITY_PACKAGES
No compatible COM security package is available
RPC_E_NO_GOOD_SECURITY_PACKAGES is HRESULT 2147549466 (0x8001011A) from winerror.h. AllStat describes it as “No security packages are installed on this machine or the user is not logged on or there are no compatible security packages between the client and server.” In the COM/RPC call control, message filtering, apartment routing, marshaling, security negotiation, or remote object lifetime, the code identifies a specific failure boundary and should not be replaced by a generic COM exception.
Telemetry should preserve this result as a separate outcome rather than merging it with unrelated COM or WinRT failures.
Where it is encountered
- Cross-apartment or cross-process COM method invocation and activation. Record the interface, method, component version, thread, apartment, process, and correlation ID.
- STA message filtering, reentrancy, call cancellation, timeout, or retry handling.
- DCOM security initialization, proxy/stub marshaling, OBJREF processing, and server object lifetime.
The immediate focus for this HRESULT is COM security negotiation with no installed, enabled, or mutually compatible authentication service for the requested settings. Keep it attached to that operation; the same numeric severity outside the owning API does not supply enough context.
Decisive interpretation boundary
Before choosing recovery, verify that client and server package lists, principals, authentication level, domain state, and logon context are captured on both sides. The decisive boundary for this HRESULT determines whether the same object can continue, a new object is required, or policy must change.
Also confirm that all observed objects, tokens, buffers, proxies, metadata files, or ACLs belong to the current operation generation and were not retained from an earlier attempt.
Correct handling and recovery
Enable a supported package, correct credentials and SPNs, or choose an allowed authentication service. Do not silently reduce security requirements.
Repeat the operation after it only when the documented precondition, identity, apartment, object generation, buffer, or configuration has changed.
Lifetime, retry, and cleanup rules
After it, determine whether the current object, interface pointer, call context, token, stream, metadata reader, asynchronous operation, or access-control instance remains valid. Release only resources owned by the failing attempt, cancel callbacks through their documented mechanism, and avoid double close, double commit, repeated activation, or replay of a non-idempotent remote method.
The retry policy for this HRESULT should state the trigger, maximum attempts, cancellation owner, and reconciliation step for effects that may have completed elsewhere.
Difference from nearby HRESULTs
It is negotiation capability failure; RPC_E_ACCESS_DENIED means a security context existed but authorization rejected access.
A support tool discussing it should name the neighboring result only after the originating API and decisive state are known.
Practical scenario
A DCOM client requires Kerberos but the server SPN is missing and NTLM is disabled. Registration fixes the SPN and preserves the required authentication level.
A regression test should reproduce it, assert the raw HRESULT and all relevant outputs, then correct only the decisive condition and verify the intended success or neighboring failure result.
References
- Microsoft: COM RPC error codes
- Microsoft: IMessageFilter
- Microsoft: RetryRejectedCall
- Microsoft: CoInitialize
- Microsoft: CoInitializeSecurity
- Microsoft: marshaling rules
- Microsoft: HRESULT values
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