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RPC_E_INVALID_STD_NAME
COM SSL principal is not a valid MSSTD name
RPC_E_INVALID_STD_NAME is HRESULT 2147549474 (0x80010122) from winerror.h. AllStat describes it as “Principal name is not a valid MSSTD name.” In the COM/RPC call control, message filtering, apartment routing, marshaling, security negotiation, or remote object lifetime, the code identifies a specific failure boundary and should not be replaced by a generic COM exception.
The hexadecimal value and symbolic name this result should remain attached to the originating API and operation generation.
Where it is encountered
- Cross-apartment or cross-process COM method invocation and activation. Record the interface, method, component version, thread, apartment, process, and correlation ID.
- STA message filtering, reentrancy, call cancellation, timeout, or retry handling.
- DCOM security initialization, proxy/stub marshaling, OBJREF processing, and server object lifetime.
The immediate focus for it is a standard principal-name string for secure RPC that has invalid prefix, escaping, certificate name, or syntax. Keep it attached to that operation; the same numeric severity outside the owning API does not supply enough context.
Decisive interpretation boundary
Before choosing recovery, verify that the raw principal is compared with the documented <code>msstd:</code> form and the server certificate identity. Validate this condition for it using the owning API state, not an inferred UI symptom.
Also confirm that all observed objects, tokens, buffers, proxies, metadata files, or ACLs belong to the current operation generation and were not retained from an earlier attempt.
Difference from nearby HRESULTs
It is syntax validation; RPC_E_FULLSIC_REQUIRED says a syntactically valid but insufficient principal form was supplied.
Merging it with the neighboring HRESULT would choose the wrong retry, recreation, authorization, or cleanup path.
Correct handling and recovery
Correct the principal at configuration generation, validate it before connection, and avoid constructing it from untrusted display names.
An unchanged retry loop for it can duplicate effects, deepen reentrancy, or hide an invalid lifetime transition.
Practical scenario
A configuration file contains an extra slash in an <code>msstd:</code> principal. Validation catches the typo before any remote activation attempt.
A regression test should reproduce it, assert the raw HRESULT and all relevant outputs, then correct only the decisive condition and verify the intended success or neighboring failure result.
Lifetime, retry, and cleanup rules
After it, determine whether the current object, interface pointer, call context, token, stream, metadata reader, asynchronous operation, or access-control instance remains valid. Release only resources owned by the failing attempt, cancel callbacks through their documented mechanism, and avoid double close, double commit, repeated activation, or replay of a non-idempotent remote method.
The retry policy for it should state the trigger, maximum attempts, cancellation owner, and reconciliation step for effects that may have completed elsewhere.
References
- Microsoft: COM RPC error codes
- Microsoft: IMessageFilter
- Microsoft: RetryRejectedCall
- Microsoft: CoInitialize
- Microsoft: CoInitializeSecurity
- Microsoft: marshaling rules
- Microsoft: HRESULT values
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