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SEC_E_INVALIDACCESSENTRY
Exact value and result class
SEC_E_INVALIDACCESSENTRY has unsigned value 2147749489 (0x80040E71) and signed 32-bit value -2147217807. AllStat describes it as “Permission in the access entry list is invalid”. In this result, one access-control entry specifies a permission, trustee or access mode invalid for the target object.
The high bit is set, so this result is a failure HRESULT. Its facility is 4 (FACILITY_ITF) and its low code is 3697 (0x0E71). These fields identify an interface-defined result family; they do not identify the provider instance, method, object generation or partial effects.
Conditions that specifically lead to the result
- Cause 1 for it: the access right does not apply to the object type.
- Cause 2 for it: the allow or deny mode is unsupported.
- Cause 3 for it: the entry combines a valid trustee with malformed property or inheritance data.
Contract boundary
OLE DB security administration represents trustees, owners, groups, protected objects and access-entry lists as separate entities. A syntactically valid trustee can still be unknown to a provider, and an allowed permission set depends on the protected object type.
Investigation of this result should start with the provider security interface, effective data-source namespace and exact trustee or access-entry structure supplied. Capture it before ADO, ATL,.NET or a database abstraction layer replaces the native HRESULT with a generic exception.
Diagnostic sequence
- Capture raw
0x80040E71and symbolic it at the native call boundary. - Identify the exact failing stage for it: one access-control entry specifies a permission, trustee or access mode invalid for the target object.
- Retrieve all OLE DB error records for it before another COM call replaces thread error information.
- Compare the live object state and provider-granted capabilities with the input that produced it.
- Reduce the operation to the smallest case that preserves the same security contract.
- Apply one evidence-backed correction for it and verify that the result is not merely replaced by a neighboring HRESULT.
Evidence to collect
A useful it event records provider CLSID and version, process architecture, interface IID and method, object correlation ID, transaction state and the immediately preceding HRESULT. When recording it data involving SIDs, account names, groups, ACL contents and protected object identifiers, use types, lengths, hashes or redacted identifiers rather than secrets or complete business data.
- Evidence 1 for it: entry index and redacted trustee.
- Evidence 2 for it: requested access mask and mode.
- Evidence 3 for it: supported rights for the protected object type.
Corrective actions
- Action 1 for it: remove or translate unsupported rights.
- Action 2 for it: validate each entry before assembling the list.
- Action 3 for it: report the exact rejected entry to policy tooling.
Practical scenario
A table ACL includes a file-system-specific right; mapping permissions to provider rights prevents it. Keeping it with the method and object state makes this scenario diagnosable instead of reducing it to “database error”.
Retry and recovery
Retry rule for it: retry after replacing the individual entry with one valid for the target object. A it retry is safe only when the relevant input, object generation, capability or external state has changed. Before replaying a modifying call that returned it, determine whether rows, schema objects or URL resources were partially created or changed.
Do not turn it into an unbounded retry loop. Preserve cancellation for it and use a fresh provider object when the failed call may have left local state ambiguous.
Difference from nearby HRESULT values
This resultLIST rejects the whole list structure, while it identifies a particular entry. Telemetry and remediation for it should keep these outcomes distinct.
Developer and operations guidance
Code handling it should release COM objects in ownership order, retain per-row, per-column or per-property statuses, and log granted capabilities rather than only requested options. While handling it, opaque values such as HACCESSOR, HROW, HCHAPTER, DBID components and provider handles must remain scoped to the object that issued them.
Operational dashboards for it should group by provider version, interface, method and normalized failure stage. A it event must not expose passwords, tokens, full connection strings, unrestricted command text or raw row contents.
Official Microsoft references
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