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RTC_E_BASIC_AUTH_SET_TLS
Operational meaning: RTC_E_BASIC_AUTH_SET_TLS
This result should be investigated at the point where RTC handles selecting an allowed authentication method, validating the challenge realm, and establishing a protected SIP transport, and the condition to prove for this HRESULT is the profile allows Basic authentication without selecting the TLS transport required by RTC.
This result is represented as 0x80EE003F in the RTC interface facility 0xEE; for this HRESULT, record the symbolic name alongside the unsigned hexadecimal value; a decimal exception alone is poor evidence for RTC protocol diagnosis.
To establish this result, inspect each server entry’s transport and authentication method before enabling the profile; for this HRESULT, this matters because the credential may be correct; the profile is rejected to prevent Basic use on an unprotected transport.
Signals worth preserving
The evidence set for this HRESULT should begin at the first failing or completing RTC boundary; for this HRESULT, reconnect and teardown events are secondary unless they caused the original result.
- Code-specific proof for this HRESULT: inspect each server entry’s transport and authentication method before enabling the profile.
- Correlation key for this HRESULT: client/server UTC time and
TLSphase. - Protocol or object snapshot for this HRESULT: 401 or 407 challenge source.
- Last completed transition for this HRESULT: authentication scheme and realm.
- Expected output for this HRESULT: credential identity without secret material.
Sanitize the result evidence before storage: secrets and user content should disappear, while framing, domains, sizes, hashes, timing, and object-state changes remain available for reproduction.
Protocol and object boundary
| RTC area | SIP authentication and TLS identity boundary |
|---|---|
| Condition to prove | the profile allows Basic authentication without selecting the TLS transport required by RTC |
| Objects to correlate | profile authentication method, challenge headers, realm, credential source, TLS certificate and tunnel |
| Safe corrective direction | set TLS for that server or choose a different supported authentication method |
At the boundary, RTC profile rules tie some authentication methods to TCP or TLS; Basic authentication requires TLS in the legacy API contract; separately, this result must be read with the rule that A certificate failure, a challenge mismatch, and invalid credentials occur at different layers and need different remediation.
Verification workflow
- At the source of it, preserve the HRESULT, method or callback, timestamp, thread/task correlation, and object generation.
- reconstruct the immediately preceding RTC transition instead of beginning with the later disconnect or UI notification.
- use protocol and object evidence to inspect each server entry’s transport and authentication method before enabling the profile.
- confirm the distinction that the credential may be correct; the profile is rejected to prevent Basic use on an unprotected transport.
- create a fresh operation generation after you set
TLSfor that server or choose a different supported authentication method, and compare its final state with the failing run.
Correlate wire data and RTC events for this HRESULT; for this HRESULT, either source alone can misclassify local validation as remote rejection, or a remote status as a local media or profile failure.
Do not confuse it with
It should not be grouped with every value from the same facility. It is tied to the condition “the profile allows Basic authentication without selecting the TLS transport required by RTC”; preserve that producing boundary before choosing recovery; the result table shows nearby alternatives.
RTC_E_SIP_TLS_INCOMPATIBLE_ENCRYPTION | client and server TLS capabilities or configured cipher/security requirements cannot establish a compatible protected channel |
|---|---|
RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_TIME_SKEW | SIP authentication validation failed because client and server time differ beyond the accepted window |
RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED | the challenge requests an authentication scheme the RTC profile or stack cannot use |
Telemetry for this HRESULT should retain these distinctions even when several outcomes share HRESULT severity.
Recovery and control flow
Resolve it at its producing layer: set TLS for that server or choose a different supported authentication method; after it, a separate UI or watchdog retry must wait until that layer reports a final state.
A retry after it is safe only after the prior transaction’s outcome is reconciled; after it, reissuing state-changing requests while the peer result is unknown can create contradictory RTC state.
Example for this HRESULT: Provisioning specifies Basic over TCP and CreateProfile rejects the cross-field combination.
Actions that do not address this condition
- An investigation should not never record Authorization header contents or plaintext passwords.
- also do not disable certificate checking or lower transport security to make authentication appear successful.
- Do not discard the result facility and state boundary when converting the result into application telemetry.
Verification after a fix
A useful it regression does more than expect an exception; the result test constructs “the profile allows Basic authentication without selecting the TLS transport required by RTC”, checks the exact HRESULT at the producing RTC boundary, and verifies state ownership before and after the targeted correction.
Technical references
- Microsoft profile creation rules — authoritative context for the boundary.
- Microsoft RTC return constants — definitions relevant when reproducing it.
- SIP authentication and TLS — API or protocol rules used to interpret it.
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