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RTC_E_SIP_HIGH_SECURITY_SET_TLS
Where the state changes: RTC_E_SIP_HIGH_SECURITY_SET_TLS
The useful interpretation of this result is narrower than “SIP error”; within selecting an allowed authentication method, validating the challenge realm, and establishing a protected SIP transport, it means the requested high-security RTC mode is paired with a signaling transport other than TLS.
The stored value is 0x80EE0040 in the RTC interface facility 0xEE; keep both forms in telemetry so COM error wrapping does not erase whether RTC produced an interface result, mapped a SIP response, or surfaced a PINT outcome.
Start the result investigation by having the trace record security-level setting, server transport, and profile selection; do not skip the distinction that security policy requires transport protection before any connection attempt is made.
Telemetry and packet evidence
- Code-specific proof: record security-level setting, server transport, and profile selection.
- Addressing context: authentication scheme and realm.
- RTC callback state: credential identity without secret material.
- Transaction boundary: certificate subject and validation failure.
- Media or profile detail: client/server UTC time and
TLSphase.
Protocol and object state
| RTC area | SIP authentication and TLS identity |
|---|---|
| Condition to prove | the requested high-security RTC mode is paired with a signaling transport other than TLS |
| Objects to correlate | profile authentication method, challenge headers, realm, credential source, TLS certificate and tunnel |
| Safe corrective direction | select TLS and a valid server identity or reduce the requirement only through explicit policy |
RTC profile rules tie some authentication methods to TCP or TLS; Basic authentication requires TLS in the legacy API contract. A certificate failure, a challenge mismatch, and invalid credentials occur at different layers and need different remediation.
Actions that do not address this condition
- never record Authorization header contents or plaintext passwords.
- Do not disable certificate checking or lower transport security merely to make authentication appear successful.
Step-by-step isolation
- Record it and
0x80EE0040at the first RTC method or event that returns it. - Prove the condition by ensuring the trace can record security-level setting, server transport, and profile selection.
- Apply one controlled change: select
TLSand a valid server identity or reduce the requirement only through explicit policy; then verify the result return value and resulting RTC state.
Recovery
The owning RTC component should select TLS and a valid server identity or reduce the requirement only through explicit policy; it should also settle or cancel its previous operation before callers begin a replacement.
Example: An application enables high security while retaining a UDP registrar entry.
Comparison with adjacent codes
RTC_E_BASIC_AUTH_SET_TLS | the profile allows Basic authentication without selecting the TLS transport required by RTC |
|---|---|
RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_FAILED | the selected SIP authentication attempt was rejected or could not validate for the challenge |
RTC_E_SIP_AUTH_TIME_SKEW | SIP authentication validation failed because client and server time differ beyond the accepted window |
Technical references
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